The question of what constitutes free will and how to describe the various arguments for and against its existence is tricky and requires careful articulation. I have been thinking about how to more carefully elucidate the issue since the interesting discussion the comments on my recent post on a debate by two philosophers on this issue, so here goes.
Let’s start with how we define free will. What I mean by having free will is that I could have decided to do something different from what I just did, which was to take a sip from a cup of coffee. This can be called contracausal free will. There are those who believe in such a contracausal free will because they think that our decisions are driven by a soul or by a ‘ghost in the machine’, (a term coined by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle to connote some kind of homunculus that exists inside our head and controls our actions) that is somehow either disconnected from our body or can act independently of it and can control it. I am going to dismiss such ideas without further discussion, because those seem to invoke religious or spiritual elements that do not have any empirical basis and seem to deny the reality that we are biological machines whose behavior is driven by the way our bodies have been shaped by evolution and personal experience, and that our behavior is driven by physiological processes obeying natural laws.
But there are people like philosopher Daniel Dennett who are atheists and do not believe in the existence of such extra-material entities and yet seem to think that even given the fact that our biology is the driver of our actions, there is still room for free will. Such people are called compatibilists and I admit I do not understand their reasoning. It seems to me to be largely dependent on the subjective experience of feeling that ‘we’ are making decisions about what actions to take, though I am pretty sure that more sophisticated reasoning is involved.
In his debate with Dennett that I wrote about earlier, philosopher Gregg Caruso argues against the free will of compatibilists but also against determinism. People who deny the existence of free will are often called determinists but that is an inaccurate label. Determinism implies that the future is completely determined by the present. But that position became no longer tenable with the discovery of quantum mechanics and the realization that at the very fundamental levels of matter, there is an inherent indeterminancy that cannot be controlled and hence the future is neither strictly determined nor predictable, except perhaps in statistical terms. Although some believers in free will have seized upon this to claim an opening for the existence free will, that cannot be the case since all that it implies is that there is an element of randomness in outcomes that we cannot control, hardly what most mean by free will which requires the ability to control actions.
So what do I believe happens when we have the experience of ‘making decisions’? Our actions are directed by our brains. Those brains consist of neural networks whose pattern of firing determines outcomes. One pattern will cause me to take that sip of coffee right now, another will cause me to defer doing so until later. So what determines which firing pattern occurs? Part of it is the way our brains have been formed by our biological history. But outside stimuli also can play a role. One external stimulus such as a fly coming into view may result in one action while a different external stimulus may result in another. At the deepest level, quantum indeteminancy may trigger one firing pattern instead of another. But the basic fact is that while ‘I’ am doing these things, that ‘I’ consists of neural networks acting according to physical laws..
Almost all the actions we take in our daily life occur involuntarily, without us making a conscious decision to do so. We know that there are many things going on in our brains and the rest of our bodies that we are not consciously aware of. Within our bodies, our organs are busily working away and we are unaware of those processes. Furthermore we do many things unconsciously, like moving our hands, without feeling that we consciously decided to do them. Those things cannot be part of free will.
But there are times when I am conscious of making a decision to take an action before that action is taken. How does one explain those in purely biological terms? The same unconscious firing of neural networks that leads to involuntary actions can also, in some cases, lead to creating a feeling in our consciousness that makes us think we are deciding to do them. As long as that feeling rises into our consciousness before our actions, we think we have decided to do something of our own volition, when in fact both the feeling of deciding to take a specific action and the action itself arose from subconscious processes over which we had no control, with the illusion of choosing arising from the fact that the former occurs slightly before the latter. That time lag is what neuroscientific studies of the brain have been reporting. Schopenhauer had a nice formulation of how we retain the sense of having free will while not having it, saying that “We can do what we wish, but we can only wish what we must”.
So what are the consequences of not believing in free will? In most cases, there will be no difference. The key areas where the issue has an impact are morality and assigning responsibility for actions, especially in the case of crime and punishment. Caruso argues that since we have no free will, it is pointless to say that people are morally culpable for their actions. We should shift from talking about good and evil people, who use their free will to choose to do those things, to instead describing actions as good or evil. People can be punished for doing evil things because we want to deter them and others from doing similar things in the future, not because we think that they deserve punishment because of their moral failings. The same holds true for those who perform good actions. They are not rewarded because they are morally superior but because we want to encourage such actions by others. In both cases, punishments and rewards provide external stimuli that have an effect on the biological history of people who either receive them themselves or see others receiving them. That will influence their subsequent actions.
Whether we have free will or not has very little impact on our everyday lives and for most practical purposes we can continue to use language that has been developed around the idea of having free will because trying to avoid doing so would require tortuous circumlocutions and may not be worth the effort. As Isaac Beshevis Singer said: “We must believe in free will. We have no choice.”
What name can we give to this set of unconscious processes that I am describing, since ‘determinism’ is not suitable? While I agree with Caruso’s arguments, I find the label he gives himself to be unsatisfying. Caruso calls himself a hard incompatibilist but that has problems. For one thing, it is not clear what extra value the word ‘hard’ is providing. It seems redundant. Secondly, defining something by what it is not is not a good practice, because then its meaning will shift if people start defining the original word differently. This is especially the case with the word compatibilism since its meaning is so hard to pin down and different people may have different understandings.
We need a better word than incompatibilism or hard incompatibilism for what Caruso and I believe and I am somewhat at a loss as to what to come up with. The best I can do is biologicalism that incorporates the idea that all our actions and decisions are determined entirely by our biology, fully incorporating the randomness that is inherent at the quantum mechanical level. But I am not sure if it will catch on. It may be that others have come up with a more suitable word that I am not aware of.
It has always struck me that the notion of free choice is a somewhat null and empty notion.
After all, what would an entirely free choice be? A choice where there are no influences working on you? A choice where no course of action is suggested by the circumstances and your own previous experiences and the mental processes you have developed? Your own experiences, personality and nature are influences on a decision just like external circumstances are. If you’re terrified of spiders, for example, then you cannot make a decision as someone who isn’t. That kind of choice would literally be a random choice. If there’s nothing making you decide one way or another, any outcome is the result of pure randomness. Any steer or impulse towards a particular course of action reduces the randomness, and an inevitable action is the only entirely non-random one there could be.
So when people feel uncomfortable about the idea they might not be able to make a “real” free choice between two alternatives, they’re actually feeling uncomfortable that their choices are less random than they might be.
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Libertarians are also incompatibilists — they think freedom requires the ability to break the laws of nature. But they think we do have this supernatural freedom, because (they think) we aren’t constrained by the laws of nature.
I haven’t read Caruso, but I’m confident that his use of the term “hard” is meant to deny the existence of freedom — tying in with the more traditional term of “hard determinist.”
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But compatibilists (like me and Dennett) are going to be happy to say our actions are determined by biology. Our disagreement is over the question of whether this fact has any moral implications. We compatibilists say that the fact that we are physical/biological beings is irrelevant to questions of moral responsibility. If you think that the scientific facts undermine our everyday notions of moral responsibility, then you’ll need to find a term that conveys that. (Again, that’s the work Caruso intends “hard” to be doing.)
“Caruso calls himself a hard incompatibilist . . . it is not clear what extra value the word ‘hard’ is providing.”
Libertarians are also incompatibilists — they think freedom requires the ability to break the laws of nature. But they think we do have this supernatural freedom, because (they think) we aren’t constrained by the laws of nature.
I haven’t read Caruso, but I’m confident that his use of the term “hard” is meant to deny the existence of freedom — tying in with the more traditional term of “hard determinist.”
“The best I can do is biologicalism that incorporates the idea that all our actions and decisions are determined entirely by our biology.”
But compatibilists (like me and Dennett) are going to be happy to say our actions are determined by biology. Our disagreement is over the question of whether this fact has any moral implications. We compatibilists say that the fact that we are physical/biological beings is irrelevant to questions of moral responsibility. If you think that the scientific facts undermine our everyday notions of moral responsibility, then you’ll need to find a term that conveys that. (Again, that’s the work Caruso intends “hard” to be doing.)
The whole problem seems to me that people approach it backwards. If consciousness is an emergent property of brain activity, then self-awareness must follow action -- even if that action is one part of our brain doing something -- our sense of self and that we made a decision is grafted on later, as part of how the brain interprets local cause/effect.
I don’t see why people can’t just accept that free will is a vivid illusion presented to us by our evolved capacity for trying to figure out what’s going on around us.
With regard to responsibility for actions: we’re part of a process that causes certain things to happen. Starting with the circumstances of birth, those are not under our control. But we still interpret people as being responsible because of the limited horizon of cause and effect that we process.
Lawyer: “So you admit that you shot the victim?”
Suspect: “It started with the Big Bang though. I’m just along for the ride.”
I still think what you describe is determinism. The fact that you cannot predict the outcome doesn’t change the fact that what you did could not have been any different (no free will) due to the internal biological events (past and present) and the external stimuli. The fact that there are some unknown and unknowable events at the quantum level doesn’t change the fact that whatever happened did happen creating a very deterministic outcome. (Or if you believe in multi-universes then all the time lines were deterministic with all the possible quantum events).
Maybe you could call it unpredictable determinism?
Jean,
I think that the term determinism has a more restrictive meaning that what you suggest. It is more than predictability. It means that if you take two completely specified identical states at any initial given time, then they will continue to be identical states at any future time.
But indeterminacy undermines that and says that random events will cause the two states to evolve differently.
I should read the rest of the comments. Cartomancer immediately makes an important point Mano did not dismantle. It doesn’t matter via what mechanism, religious or otherwise. There are only two ways things operate in the world, picking from a distribution or determined. There is no other possibility. You can believe in souls to your heart’s content, but there is no way a soul can work other than either distribution (weight or not has no bearing on the logical implications, though at least weighted distributions fit the natural evidence better) or determinism.
I actually, am fundamentally a believer in determinism, despite the fact I can not martial real evidence concerning the matter and the quantum arguments are strong. But, we used to believe that racemic mixtures were a rule in certain process, and it turns out that careful study of kinetics reveals that d/l actually depends upon orientation prior to formation.
The quantum arguments are stronger, and I may very well be wrong. But it also doesn’t effectively matter in terms of how we want to treat other humans.
“I could have decided to do something different from what I just did, which was to take a sip from a cup of coffee”
How are you going to empirically test that you could have done otherwise or not?
You can’t?
Then it’s a meaningless definition, resulting in the kind of semantics apologists are so fond off.
I’ll just wait for the scientific consensus regarding the way the human brains work.
“The key areas where the issue has an impact are morality and assigning responsibility for actions, especially in the case of crime and punishment.”
Nope. Norway, with its famously soft approach to crime and punishment, doesn’t consist of hardcore determinists.
At the other hand there is the famous little exchange:
Suspect: you honor, scientific consensus says humans don’t have free will. So all my decisions are determined and you can’t hold me responsible for my crimes.
Judge: exactly the same applies to me and I cannot decide anything else than sending you to prison for five years. Next case.
That’s what you get with definitions like yours: a meaningless and useless discussion that’s doomed not to get anywhere.
We should transfer the topic of free will from philosophy to science (specifically neurobiology), just as has happened with for instance time and space. Also the topic of free will seems to be a typical American obsession.
Mano,
That depends on which quantum interpretation you take for so-called random events.
Jean @10: Not really. Many Worlds is deterministic in the sense that the “wavefunction of the universe” evolves deterministically. But we don’t experience the wavefunction. We experience one branch of it, and have no idea which branch we will be on in the next microsecond. So, for the purpose of this discussion, it is no more deterministic than any other interpretation. Similarly, the determinism of De Broglie–Bohm theory is not observable to us.
So much circular rationalization leading to dead-ends. So much mental onanism.
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Disbelief in free will brings about induced dysmorphia: body parts moving about independently of the mind, Tourette’s-like vocal utterances.
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In most cases, disbelief in free will have different -- and universally worse -- consequences than belief in free will.
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I agree with Isaac Beshevis Singer said: “We must believe in free will. We have no choice.” You have no choice if you want to maintain sanity.
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No need to delve into quantum mechanics to bring in indeterminism to the free will question. Centuries ago, Epicurus -- who also hypothesized the atomistic nature of matter -- hypothesized that atomistic random motion on the microscopic level bring about free will at the macroscopic level.
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Mr Singham is correct to state that discussion of free will brings about discussion of morality which in turn brings about discussion about responsibility, accountability, crime and punishment.
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Mr Singham is misguided to propose that actions should be disconnected from the actors. Do not judge the person; just judge if the action is evil or good. Apparently, Mr Singham would accept the “Devil made me do it!!!” excuse.
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Lower lifeforms are more pragmatic than ideologues like Mr Singham. When members of their herd misbehave, wolves, apes, wild horses, etc.. banish the miscreants, sometimes even kill the miscreants.
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Science, as we know it today (2020 AD), is derived from mixing Natural Philosophy with a philosophy called Pragmatism which originated in Scotland in the 1700’s. Isaac Newton is the first to merge Natural Philosophy with Pragmatism (Calculus is just one pragmatic element).
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Unfortunately, Mr Singham and others are distancing from pragmatism and are embracing ideology, namely materialism ideology. Mr Singham is theoretical physicist, not an experimentalist so it is not a surprise that he is ideological. For centuries, matter was particles. Then came along Quantum Mechanics and matter is a combination of particle and wave. Is that the end of the story about matter? I do not think so. I propose there many more components to matter, at least one of which relates to consciousness. Atheists such as Singham do not want to explore the “meta-quantum” nature of matter for they have already concluded -- ideologically -- that all “meta-quantum”, all metaphysics are illusions and un-real,
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Can there be life without consciousness? So far, life has not be created from inert elements. Human will succeed, eventually. Minimum requirements for life will be modelled by a complex mathematical/logic paradigm. How does bacterial consciousness differ from jelly fish consciousness, from insect consciousness, from human consciousness? Answers to these questions are not low hanging fruit.
Oh not this again.
Scenario 1 -- I mistakenly take a sip of coffee from my spouse’s cup. I then spit out this bitter tasting liquid and hop into my handy time machine and go back in time to sip my tea. Free will ? To which you will say uh no -- its not sufficient to go back in time , you need to reset your brain too and erase all memories and changes that it may have.
Scenario 2 -- I goto sip a cup of coffee -- At this decision point , the universe splits into a set of parallel universes and every single possibility is enacted and then the wave function collapses and the decision that is made is the most probabilistic one -- or these universes all simultaneously exist and in one I sip a cup of coffee and in the other I respond to Something That Is Wrong On The Internet . Free Will? To which you will say uh no -- In every universe you will always make the same choice , even though it is only 1 you or something like that.
Your definition doesnt make sense. Your test determines whether the world is random or not -- it does not determine anything like choice -- much less the freeness of it.
In some ways I think this is like hearing music (or perhaps an Opera song in your case!) -- You can look at what it means and what you experience and why it resonates with you or you could say eh particles vibrating that create sound waves that cause other electrons to change their orbit . You can choose which helps you understand the world better -- or maybe you cant.
OT : the single sign on seems broken
@12, what does free will mean to you? We can draw a box around any system and declare it has free will. I’m not sure in the utility of those words at all.
In some way they are a nonsensical notion of how the world works that far too many people take for granted.
You have two possibilities, there is freedom in the way any system you have drawn a box around could work, if it is picking from a distribution. The freedom is that the system is not determined. But it also now has an element that is acausal. It’s still fine to assign blame to that system, but accept that it didn’t have to turn out that way, and a bad dice roll is responsible for the outcome. It was ‘free’ in the sense that the occurrence was a random draw.
Then you have the possibility the system you drew that box around is determined. Well the system now certainly has ‘will.’ It performs a very precise function, but it has no freedom. It had to occur that way.
If you want to call ‘free will’ a system that draws from weighted distributions. Fine, but I prefer calling it a system that draws from weighted distributions, then we don’t get confused by the vague notions we may have about words.
If you’re an idiot spiritualist, maybe you believe in acausal souls where some are good and some are bad. Then you must be a determinist, if you are not also a moron. Some just do ‘good’ things for no reason other than God or some shit made them, but those good things are determined, and then you have ‘bad’ souls that acausally do ‘bad’ things. Which means God is a fucking asshole for creating ‘bad’ souls that have no freedom to be anything but bad. If that soul is drawing from a distribution, well then you are also a moron, congratulations. You believe in a system of eternal punishment for a mostly good soul that due to a one out of a million random draw did something bad, and an eternal reward for a mostly bad soul out of a million for the same. If you’re an intelligent spiritualist you simply have some sense of higher forms of organization, don’t make dumb claims, and typically are a pretty cool person. Then again us materialists also believe in higher forms of organization, so at that point I can’t even truly distinguish myself from a deist in any meaningful way.
You get to make a choice in what you want to believe, because I drew a box around you. It has a label: asshole #39. You can believe in freedom, i.e. distributions, which given our uncertainty is a good model of the world. Or you can pick will, i.e. determinism. But free will to me has no value beyond a description of a social construct as a system, such as yourself, that likely desires to be treated as though you deserve autonomy. That is the power of Dennett’s take on the subject. It has no bearing on whether you are spiritual or materialist, though. That’s just a red herring.
But by all means, 12, carry on your Gish gallop, your steed covers a remarkable distance.
@13 we are converging on fairly similar reasoning. I think it’s valid to say any system make a choice. You draw a box about it. Give it input, the choice is the output, right?
Now the system may make extremely reliable choices, or we may have trouble modeling it, and add in noise, now the choices are unreliable. But that is the only thing the word ‘choice’ means. We drew a box around a system, it gets input, choice is the output.
Been reflecting on this, and I think the last comment I wrote is by far the most important. I think the primary thing most people are hopelessly confused about is what constitutes choice. The fact that they are incapable of assigning a snowy mountain top as a system that has ‘choice’. That they believe only noisy human have choice and other noisy systems do not.
But then we also fall into the problem that so many people don’t understand the concept of noise. Noise does not have to truly be randomness, it’s a reflection of the uncertainty inherent in us human observers that can only make very limited samples of the world in order to construct our representations of it.