This is cool: Simon Conway Morris gave a talk at Baylor, and Cody was there. Conway Morris is a smart fellow who does some very interesting work, and now I learn that he’s also a charming speaker — even though I completely disagree with his conclusions, I wish he’d come a little farther north so I could listen to him. I’d most like to hear him talk about Cambrian and pre-Cambrian paleontology, but it sounds like he’s instead lecturing specifically on the ideas where he’s most wrong, his belief in the overwhelming power of natural selection (or perhaps, design) to drive convergence. Convergence happens, of course, but Conway Morris seems to favor sifting the evidence for similarities and ignoring the differences, and divergence happens, too.
Right now, I’m seeing everything flipped around 180° from Conway Morris’s perspective. He thinks humans were inevitable, and emphasizes the similarities in organismal form. Developmental biology is coming off a long ‘model systems’ jag, and evo-devo is more and more emphasizing diversity and differences. I’m seeing molecular pathways that are getting recycled from their origins in single-celled organisms, so all animals have the same roots, the same pathways, and nothing radically new in their assembly and function … yet the same molecular tools build sequoias and squid and seahorses and starfish. Convergence is the interesting exception, not the rule. Molecular genetics enables a greater diversity of possible paths than can be accommodated on the planet, I suspect, and the testimony of the natural world is that morphological variation dominates despite common underlying mechanisms.
Another interesting item at the Baylor talk: William Dembski was in attendance. It sounds like it was more a tirade than a question — “western science has abandoned God” — but come on, Cody, you didn’t tell us what Conway Morris’s response was!
“Evolution is far more predictable than generally thought, whether we are talking about molecules or societies.”
Being an archaeologist, this quote caught my eye. I think he is right about societies, assuming he is talking about human societies. Once we have biological humans, the overall general framework for the types of societies that evolve in particular ecological contexts will be roughly the same. Ancient states evolved in places like Mesoamerica, Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Andes under particular conditions, while they did not in far nortern or southern latitudes.
But of course biological evolution is a whole different story. Like apples and rocks.
From your link:
He was also careful to point out directionality and predictability in evolution need not at all imply teleology.
Which probably won’t satisfy many around here, but doesn’t really offer much in the way of real comfort for the IDists (though I’m sure they’ll spin some for themselves).
SCM was always one of my favorite lecturers as an undergrad – his sarcastic asides always made me chuckle.
I once heard Conway Morris speak in Cambridge. He ended his talk by producing a slide of the Turin Shroud, later claiming that it was genuine. It was hard to know whether he was being serious.
I heard Conway Morris give the same talk the day before he spoke at Baylor. He is a fascinating and captivating speaker, although I don’t agree with his conclusions.
He showed many convincing examples of convergence, including several placental and marsuipal animals with amazing similarities, but if intelligence and self awareness are so inevitable, then the real question is not why do we not see or hear from extraterrestrials, but where are the superintelligent marsupials?
At the end of his talk, someone in the audience asked him, “What do you think of Intelligent Design?” Conway Morris simply replied “It’s utter nonsense.”
Hard for the ID folks to find any solace in that, either.
I would love to read a detailed response to Conway Morris’s critique of Gould’s “Wonderful Life”. The basic idea I remember is that he argued that the Burgess Shale creatures were only apparently strange, and at the deep level (hox genes) they were actually quite unexceptional; and second, that convergent evolution would have erased the apparent strangenesses.
To me (a non-biologist), Gould’s description of proliferation, decimation, and contingency is very persuasive, and is somewhat generalizable to human history. (It also reminds me of Campbell’s “Evolutionary Epistemology”.)
But I guess I’d like to know how well Gould’s idea is faring within biology itself.
It’s also funny that the theist (Conway Morris) and the atheists (Dennett and Dawkins) both want to see inevitability in evolution. (Dennett accuses Gould of being a theist, but I think that Dennett’s Panglossianism has some of the same wishful deficiencies as theism.
One thing I remember from Conway Morris’s book is that he talked both about deep-level similarity (hox genes) and visible similarity (e.g. placental-marsupial convergences) without distinguishing the two. In my reading, only the deep-level similarity is an argument against Gould; Gould certainly knew about convergence.
Sorry, but “humans are inevitable” sounds like a stunningly crackpot thing to believe.
Dembski: “western science has abandoned God”
As opposed to the theistic science done in China and Japan?
Once the question “Was humanity inevitable?” is asked, I don’t think a “Yes” answer is ridiculous on its face, as Jon would suggest. But doesn’t it seem like a poor scientific question? There are so many more interesting and productive questions to ask along the way….
Morris’ question of predictability and directionality in evolution is interesting, for the possibility for ETI’s for example. But I have a hard time wrap my head around a discussion of forced constraints.
One reason, besides my ignorance here, could be that we haven’t developed necessary means to do so yet. Which wouldn’t surprise me, since the discussion of convergences is another argument for design.
IDiots have a problem of describing what designed structures looks like. Of course, we know that no single complexity measure can describe all types of structure.
Likewise, Morris TEism has a problem of describing what convergent traits are. He argues that an octopus tentacle is comparable in behavior of a human arm, because it can choose a sectioned arm motion. But as Cody notes, there are more traits to tentacles and arms than that.
And I suspect there is more to functional similarity than that. It is all very well to argue that an elephant leg is functional similar to an insect leg. But try switch these “functional similar” traits. Even after compensating for different sizes, I bet you can’t get them to bear the same load and/or move.
So from the point of view of a simple comparison test, “functional similarity” is rather abstract and vague. I could as well argue that wings are functionally similar to legs, since they are both systems for movement. And somewhere here I loose sight of Morris description of convergence.
Finally, I suspect there is an implicit argument for souls in Morris world view, since he is satisfied with human-like intelligence. And why he thinks this is the end of development for intelligence.
But I believe we can amplify Cody’s argument that it is an anthropocentric theory.
It is easy to think that since life started out simple and evolution can go anywhere, it would eventually build some more complex traits than unicellularity, chemotaxy et cetera. But if we evolved from bacterias, why are there still bacterias … um, no, that wasn’t quite what I wanted to say.
The question is why unicellularity is such a popular trait? Why, it must be because that is the ultimate prediction, dare I say purpose, of Morris TE!
The best description of William Dembski yet.
Morris’ question of predictability and directionality in evolution is interesting, for the possibility for ETI’s for example. But I have a hard time wrap my head around a discussion of forced constraints.
One reason, besides my ignorance here, could be that we haven’t developed necessary means to do so yet. Which wouldn’t surprise me, since the discussion of convergences is another argument for design.
IDiots have a problem of describing what designed structures looks like. Of course, we know that no single complexity measure can describe all types of structure.
Likewise, Morris TEism has a problem of describing what convergent traits are. He argues that an octopus tentacle is comparable in behavior of a human arm, because it can choose a sectioned arm motion. But as Cody notes, there are more traits to tentacles and arms than that.
And I suspect there is more to functional similarity than that. It is all very well to argue that an elephant leg is functional similar to an insect leg. But try switch these “functional similar” traits. Even after compensating for different sizes, I bet you can’t get them to bear the same load and/or move.
So from the point of view of a simple comparison test, “functional similarity” is rather abstract and vague. I could as well argue that wings are functionally similar to legs, since they are both systems for movement. And somewhere here I loose sight of Morris description of convergence.
Finally, I suspect there is an implicit argument for souls in Morris world view, since he is satisfied with human-like intelligence. And why he thinks this is the end of development for intelligence.
But I believe we can amplify Cody’s argument that it is an anthropocentric theory.
It is easy to think that since life started out simple and evolution can go anywhere, it would eventually build some more complex traits than unicellularity, chemotaxy et cetera. But if we evolved from bacterias, why are there still bacterias … um, no, that wasn’t quite what I wanted to say.
The question is why unicellularity is such a popular trait? Why, it must be because that is the ultimate prediction, dare I say purpose, of Morris TE!
The best description of William Dembski yet.
“argument for design” – argument from design
Seems I have been around too many IDiots lately. :-)
“argument for design” – argument from design
Seems I have been around too many IDiots lately. :-)
Convergence–even between eutherians and marsupials is indeed the interesting exception. No marsupial ungulates (roos are similar only in diet, therefore digestion), cetaceans, rodents (marsupial “mice”–the dasyurids–are vicious little insectivores, more like shrews), bats, pinnipeds, ETC.!)
And most problematically for the ‘inevitable humans’ theory, no marsupial hominids!
Dembski didn’t actually say the things after the first “blah blah blah,” I was just poking fun there. His question was rather tame and uninteresting and I think Conway Morris handled him quite nicely (Short version: Dembski thinks abiogenesis is impossible; Conway Morris talked about some exciting new evidence in the field). Sorry if I misled you there.
However, listening to Conway Morris speak was only half as fun as watching Dembski scribble on his pad everytime he heard something objectionable (“Evolution is clearly true…” or “The Cambrian of course provides no problem at all for evolutionary theory…”).
I was honestly expecting more God-talk from Conway Morris, considering the venue, but he pretty much kept to the science.
CCP: Yeah, I think that the convergent-marsupial idea depends on cherrypicking the most persuasive convergences (which for me was the extinct marsupial tapir). And the non-convergence goes far beyond just marsupiality or not, I think.
Wiki: “Other names by which [the Thylacine] is occasionally identified include Marsupial Wolf, Hyena, Zebra Wolf, Kangaroo Wolf, Zebra Opossum, Marsupial Tiger, Tiger Cat, Tasmanian Pouched Wolf and Hyena Opussum.”
Baylor is an interesting place to go to: very conservative, but not conservative enough for Tom Delay, and I think that their biology dept. eaches evolution.
John-
DeLay was expelled from Baylor for drinking and vandalism. But they do teach evolution, to the dismay of some of the students here.
maybe by western science he meant those infidels at Berkeley, Davis and the loathed Humboldt???
DeLay said that the people in the church where he was speakinc shouldn’t send their kiddies to either Texas A&M or Baylor because”…they teach evolution”. Baylor wasn’t a “bible college” when I attended some 50 years ago. Divinity never dictated to A&S. Lab assistants still repeat the mantra: “You don’t have to believe it but you are responsible for the material”. Geology courses never had “flood geology” or “creation” sections nor did biology teach from Genesis. BU has dropped the SBConvention. This Morris may actually open up possibilities to traditionalist critics.
Quoth John Emerson:
Where on earth do you get “inevitability” from either Dennett or Dawkins? Citations, please? For a fairly blunt rebuttal of such an idea from Dennett, I’d invite you to watch his interview with Robert Wright on BeliefNet. (Yes, the notorious interview that Wright distorted to try to convince people that Dennett was contradicting himself.) Dennett’s defence of contingency in evolution was quite unequivocal.
Inevitability was the wrong word. I’m thinking of Gould’s accusation of Panglossianism. As I remember, Gould accused Dennett (and probably Dawkins) of justifying every actual evolutionary outcome as an optimal outcome, even if the path to it was contingent. Gould always holds open the possibility that the road not taken might have been a better one in some biological sense.
If you assume that actual outcomes are optimal, it’s something like inevitability even if you grant various paths to the optimum.
I’m sure that both sides have hedged and qualified by now to the point that it’s possible that they’re saying about the same thing, but I think that the difference of emphasis is imprtant.
This is an odd complaint from someone who repeatedly claimed that the Intelligent Designer in his own theory was not necessarily God.
Argh, I hate it when I have to regret making a joke.
Dembski never said “western science has abandoned God” at the talk. That was my addition, I thought it would be obvious, I was wrong. Sorry about that.
At any rate, I updated that little segment to make it clear that it’s a joke.
I think it’s pretty accurate to say Dennett and Dawkins are adaptationists, but they’re still pro-contingency AFAIK. As they see it, even if most organisms are following optimal solutions, those solutions depend so sensitively on environmental pressures that they probably wouldn’t be the optimal ones if history was replayed.
Conway Morris, on the other hand, thinks the same small set of solutions remain optimal over a huge space of possible environments.
That just proves that wolves, hyenas, zebras, kangaroos, opossums and tigers have all basically converged to the same critter. Conway Morris for the win!
I think it’s pretty accurate to say Dennett and Dawkins are adaptationists, but they’re still pro-contingency AFAIK. As they see it, even if most organisms are following optimal solutions, those solutions depend so sensitively on environmental pressures that they probably wouldn’t be the optimal ones if history was replayed.
This sounds like a good way to put it. Any optimization by natural selection is obviously towards very limited local optima, otherwise we’d still be bacteria…
A couple of comments…
First, I agree with an earlier remark by PZ about Conway-Morris’s prose style. It’s not that great, unless you think that turgidity is a plus.
Second, I think the subtitle of Conway-Morris’s book (“inevitable humans in a lonely universe”) is something of a tease and not entirely representative of his views described within ‘Life’s Solution’. Conway-Morris doesn’t really claim that humanity as we know it is inevitable, but that something *like* our species, especially in terms of intelligence, appears inevitable.
Scott Hatfield, OM:
Never underestimate the human brain’s ability to praise itself!
Thanks Anton and windy for flexing my brain. Perhaps I can start to wrap my head around these things eventually.
Thanks Anton and windy for flexing my brain. Perhaps I can start to wrap my head around these things eventually.
I didn’t like “Life’s Solution,” but C-M was not arguing for the inevitability of humanity as we know it, just some kind of intelligent, social, planet-dominating species.
The arguments about the the predominant influence of convergence on evolution, as far as I could tell, is total speculation. It’s the most frustrating thing about evolutionary biology (or biology in general), is that rather than just admit that lots of things are important and its messy and we don’t have a lot of data, everyone fights to the death that their own pet favorite concept/mechanism is the MOST important.
I he seriously goes off the deep end in the last chapter or so.
The accusation that Dennett/Dawkins deny contingency is garbage. Gould was many good things, but he was hysterical and dishonest when engaging his critics.
Blake: This is the problem of induction writ large, and (given the recent thread with the unctuous Mr. Tripplehorn) more than a little ironic. We should be suspicious of using the fact of intelligence as an argument for the inevitability of intelligence, so it is certainly no reliable argument for the Designer of Tripplehorn’s dreams.
On another note, I don’t know if Gould was hysterical in dealing with Conway-Morris, but it is clear that no love was lost between them, and I have never seen an entirely satisfactory explanation of why this should be so.
Gould played up the weirdness of the Burgess shale faunua, taking the view that almost everything should be in its own phylum, hence contigency becomes extremely important (but for some small fluke somewhere, life could have been very very different)
After a lot of work, SCM showed that to a large degree, the weirdness is superficial, and a lot of the Burgess critters weren’t quite as weird and unrelated to modern phyla as Gould made out (a lot of the confusion is due to the fact that, at the time of the Cambrian, most ‘phyla’ were pretty much all worm-like critters and lacked their present distinguishing characteristics). I doubt Gould really appreciated that, and I think SCM was a little embarrassed at being quoted in one of Gould’s books (Wonderful Life?) announcing (in the early stages of his research), “not another f***ing phylum!”
C-M was not arguing for the inevitability of humanity as we know it, just some kind of intelligent, social, planet-dominating species.
If it’s so inevitable, how come it took so long? I mean, the majority of life on Earth has gone extinct, what , 5 times over? And yet there is no evidence that any of those prior epochs contained “some kind of intelligent, social, planet-dominating species”, despite having had a good long time to develop one.
Something that happens 1 time out of 5 is a long way from “inevitable”.
Conway Morris and Gould weren’t especially hostile; Gould was friendly to CM, and CM politely disagreed with Gould. Dennet and Gould were mutually very hostile (Dennett accuse Gould both of being a Marxist and of being a theist.) I think that Gould also thought of Dennett as a kind of stalking horse for Dawkins, and I think that’s about right.
Gould never accused Dawkins of denying contingency; I did, and I have admiited that that was the wrong thing to say. He accused him of Panglossianism, which I guess means adaptationism, more or less.
To restate what I said, Gould believed in a more open future than Conway Morris, Dawkins, or Dennett, and he believed, I think, that the other three wanted to find more order and predictability in evolution than there actually was.
Going back to something above, I think that the deeper the level at which the Burgess organisms were different, the better Gould’s case. I don’t feel that Conway Morris dealt with that question, though he touched on it. I’d still love to see PZ write about this.
A species which is very very human-like, though–bipedal, warm-blooded, live-bearing, vocalizing, with a precision grip and twin forward-facing crystallin-lensed camera eyes using rhodopsins, and so forth. Conway Morris’ aliens might not be identical to Homo sapiens, but they’re as humanoid as the average Star Trek character.
“On any other suitable planet there will I suggest be animals very like mammals, and mammals very like apes.”
I don’t recall Gould claiming that Dennett and Dawkins denied contingency, though. AFAIK his chief argument with them was on a different subject: namely, how many individual traits are directly produced by natural selection, rather than being unselected byproducts of other, strongly-selected traits.
Well…I’m not sure Conway Morris’ work has really panned out that way. For instance, his proposal to unite halkieriids and Wiwaxia seems to have been largely accepted, so Gould lost out there…but Conway Morris’ most recent paper places them as a lophotrochozoan stem group, meaning they certainly could be given their own phylum. A lot of the Burgess critters got stuck in one stem group or another, which doesn’t really diminish their weirdness at all IMO–just means we’re reasonably confident which modern taxa are most closely related to them. Which is a great success scientifically, but doesn’t speak to Gould’s point one way or the other.
I wouldn’t say it was all that polite. There’s an interview with Conway Morris here, where in response to Gould calling him ‘a close colleague and a personal friend,’ he says, “That’s his way of putting things, not mine. In America the way of describing things is very different. I have a handful of very good friends, and they are really dear to me. Gould is not among them.”
Burn!
Thanks for that link.
SCM wrote: What bothers me most is that Gould has used the Burgess Shale as a vehicle to drive in his own philosophical, if not ideological stands.
…a pot calling another pot black?
Eh, I think it’s probably true of anyone pushing a grand theory of How Evolution Has Worked Over The History Of Our Planet: Dawkins, Gould, and Conway Morris alike. Whether or not they’re right, they’re necessarily the sort of person who’s comfortable trusting their hunches. So when they err, it’s usually by reading their personal philosophy into reality.