The options with the war


As the US-Israeli war with Iran and Lebanon drags on, trying to figure out how it will end becomes harder. Trying to predict where wars will head is bad enough at the best of times, given their chaotic nature, but doing so with reckless leaders like Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, who seem to be willing to do anything for their own short-term benefit, can be seen as an exercise in futility.

On the surface, it would appear that since Iran is in a much weaker position militarily, it will be forced at some point to sue for peace under unfavorable conditions. At least that is what Trump’s rhetoric seems to indicate that he believes. He keeps saying that the US has already won or that the Iranians want to make a deal. But Iran has steadfastly refuted that latter claim. This may be because for the Iranian regime, this is an existential threat and hence they have no interest in agreeing to anything that does not keep them in power. So for them, dragging this thing out indefinitely, and inflicting any damage they can on the global economy by (say) attacking the oil infrastructure and closing the Strait of Hormuz is an acceptable price to pay and they will hold out until Trump offers them something that they can accept.

I found this interview by the New Yorker‘s Isaac Chotiner with Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group,. about what the various parties are seeking and what they might accede to, quite enlightening.

Look, the primary objective in any negotiation would be a deal that would insure the Islamic Republic’s survival. That has several requirements. One is, of course, that the hostilities against Iran would stop and that they would not start again—because Iran doesn’t want to end up being another country, like Lebanon or Gaza or Syria, that Israel or the United States can decide to bomb at will. This concept of the U.S. or Israel scheduling a Google Calendar reminder to bomb Iran every six months is not a situation that the Islamic Republic can tolerate, or believes that it would be able to survive, in the medium to long run. So the primary objective is to basically create the conditions under which Israel and the United States are deterred from committing an act of aggression against Iran ever again.

But, at this point, just that is not enough, because Iran has been living with economic warfare against it for several decades. And, after this war, it would have to reconstruct in order to survive. And this is why it would need economic incentives that are real, not just promised and never delivered. So it also needs some sort of arrangement in which it would be able to secure economic reprieve. And that means that if the hot war ends, but Iran ends up in another cold war, that would be as fatal to the regime as the continuation of the hot war. And this is why Iran will impose difficult conditions for accepting a ceasefire.

[T]his war has basically rendered Iran ungovernable unless it can undergo serious reconstruction. This isn’t just about sanctions relief. The Iranian regime needs money for reconstruction. It’s really as simple as that. There is no agreement in which it would accept American promises because it’s been burned by the U.S. too many times. And, in the absence of sanctions relief, the regime knows it would die on the vine.

If it were up to Trump, I think he would accept a less-than-ideal agreement, but he has repeatedly demonstrated, and this is not a new phenomenon, that he lets negotiations be conducted by people who believe in those maximum estimates. What Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff have reportedly put on the table is almost a mirror image of Mike Pompeo’s twelve demands in Trump’s first term in office. And these are basically Israeli demands. So I don’t think Trump is acting independently here. These are a set of demands that have been in the circles that are close to him for many years, and they have become a kind of orthodoxy that I don’t think he can abandon, even if he doesn’t personally believe in them. So he’s stuck with them.

And now the problem, even if Trump wants to step aside from the maximalism of the current demands—the Iranians have demands that will be very difficult for him to meet. So I have a hard time really seeing how we can get to a diplomatic agreement anytime soon.

Trump, at this point, even if he wants to come down off the high horse and put aside some of the maximalist demands of Israel, would still have to make concessions to the Iranians that would be very uncomfortable for him, I think, at a personal level. And this is why I think that, although Israel did start this war and dragged the U.S. into it, ending it is really no longer dependent on Israel. It’s dependent on Iran and Trump. And, as I said, those two have positions that are totally incompatible at this moment.

I think Trump believed some of the things that we now know Bibi told him before the war, including the idea that the regime was so brittle that killing the Supreme Leader would result in people coming to the streets again and taking over government institutions. And, yes, Trump made the decision to go in. Israel didn’t make that decision for him, but I don’t think we can ignore that Israel created a context for him to believe this would be an easy undertaking.

As I said, I do not think that anyone has a really good handle on how things will play out but at least this was a thoughtful analysis of the possibilities.

Comments

  1. Dunc says

    You may also find this analysis from military historian Bret Devereaux worth reading: Miscellanea: The War in Iran.

    [T]his war is dumb as hell.

    I am going to spend the next however many words working through what I think are the strategic implications of where we are, but that is my broad thesis: for the United States this war was an unwise gamble on extremely long odds; the gamble (that the regime would collapse swiftly) has already failed and as a result locked in essentially nothing but negative outcomes. Even with the regime were to collapse in the coming weeks or suddenly sue for peace, every likely outcome leaves the United States in a meaningfully worse strategic position than when it started.

    The key point here is that Iran’s relative military weakness doesn’t actually matter all that much in terms of strategic outcomes.

  2. JM says

    On the surface, it would appear that since Iran is in a much weaker position militarily, it will be forced at some point to sue for peace under unfavorable conditions. At least that is what Trump’s rhetoric seems to indicate that he believes.

    Trump thinks he has demonstrated the US’s total military superiority and thus gets to mostly set the terms on the Iranians. The Iranians have been planning for this for decades. They never planned to beat the US’s air superiority, they planned to close the Strait of Hormuz and keep it closed enough to inflict global pain. Trump has not yet grasped that the two sides are fighting entirely different wars. Trump doesn’t get to pick the grounds Iran is fighting on, either he faces them on their terms, forces them to fight on US terms or finds some way around. If he could do that then he would have a lot more power to set terms on Iran.
    To add to that Trump keeps gloating. That is the last thing Iran officials want to hear and makes negotiations harder. Somebody needs to tell Trump that it would be easier to negotiate if he keeps his mouth shut until the negotiations are done.

  3. birgerjohansson says

    To avoid Iranians reaching the Strait of Hormuz with mines and portable weapons, they would need to capture and hold a land bridge maybe 50 miles thick inland along the northern shore.
    And that still leaves drones and missiles launched from deep north. Russia and possibly China will be happy to sell the Iranians hardware destroyed by bombing.
    .
    Most important- the oil tankers will not start moving just because USA shoots down 99% of drones and missiles. It is 100% or nothing. Because of insurance companies and their requirements.
    And as this is an existential war for the mullahs, hardships for the common people will not force a surrender.

  4. lanir says

    Because the GOP majority in Congress has given the reins of this war to Trump alone, he’s been able to do whatever he wants and pretend his nonsense is objective truth. I doubt Netanyahu had to convince him so much as he just had to spin a fairy tale that Trump wanted to believe in. The difference is that convincing requires explaining how to get from the starting point to the ending point. Spinning a fairy tale just requires Trump to wish that the real world resembled the story he’s told.

    Maybe we need someone to tell Trump another bedtime story where he’s a wise leader for… let’s call it showing restraint instead of losing. And that’s how the little king saved the stock market, yay! And everyone was very impressed with him and they all lived happily ever after. Until the next manufactured crisis.

  5. garnetstar says

    Jorg @6, you are right. That is what we all fear, because with Trump, that is always possible and/or likely. Also, once done, he’s unlikely to stop with Iran.

    Dunc @1 and JM @2, it’s right that, though Iran doesn’t match the US in military hardware, it’s got a lot of other muscle to flex: oil, gas, heat, fertilizer (aka, food shortages), and helium, which is apparently invaluable, all scarce, all prices skyrocketing. Iran has the power, apparently, to end the world’s economy, and they’re doing it. (As said, Iran seems to have really thought this through, for decades.) That’s why my perception is that, so far, they’ve won.

    I also think that Israel has dropped out of Trump’s mind, and it’s just him and Iran now. He has no concern for Israel’s welfare, only for his. And, Trump always has a scapegoat, always knifes someone in the back even when there’s no need, and there’s certainly a need here, he needs someone to blame. So, as he did with Musk, it may well be Netanyahu and Israel. Because, they’re there.

    I’m just guessing that a lot of other countries, Gulf States and more, will get involved in getting some actual negotiations going and coming to some kind of resolution. Because, the rest of the world is not going to stand around letting an impotent madman destroy their economies. And yeah, Iran may get a lot of what the article above says, because Trump has a pressing need to get the hell out of there (he doesn’t know it, but it’s already too late for him.) He may get frustrated and just say “Yeah, yeah, whatever you want, it’s Israel’s fault for making me do this war.” And, of course, he may well not: unpredictable. Whichever way, I don’t think that the rest of the world will be inactive and put up with the damage to them.

  6. file thirteen says

    @Jorg #6

    Nobody wants to use nukes, but if anyone does then threats to use them will abound. Russia and Israel live for the day that precedent is set.

  7. springa73 says

    #1 Dunc

    All of the reasons in that analysis are probably why no previous US administration, even that of George W. Bush with his “Axis of Evil” rhetoric, launched an attack on Iran, or even seriously considered it as far as I can tell. Anyone with decent knowledge of the strategic situation in the Middle East could have told Trump and his advisors why attacking Iran was such a bad idea despite the US and Israel having vast military superiority, but this administration doesn’t listen to anyone who is knowledgeable.

  8. Dunc says

    Most important- the oil tankers will not start moving just because USA shoots down 99% of drones and missiles. It is 100% or nothing. Because of insurance companies and their requirements.

    It’s not just insurance… People seem to forget that these ships are crewed by people, and those people are not slaves. If the crew don’t want to sail, you can’t make them, no matter how well-insulated the vessel owners may be against financial losses. That’s why even ideas like the US government offering to underwrite losses won’t be enough to get traffic moving again -- because the crews of these vessels don’t want to die, and they don’t see why they should risk their lives (any more than they are already) for the sake of Trump’s ego, the global economy, or the profits of the shipping line they work for.

    Seafaring is dangerous enough as it is, without people throwing high explosive around.

  9. KG says

    What’s puzzling me is why Netanyahu thought this was going to be easy: the Israelis are now apparently running seriously short of interceptors, and Iranian missiles are starting to land. Very few people get killed or injured (at least among Jewish Israelis -- quite a large proportion of casualties seem to have been Israeli Arabs or foreign workers) because their warning systems are working and (for Jewish Israelis) excellent shelter provision is available. But the economic damage must already be significant, and people don’t like having their homes destroyed even if they are uninjured. Netanyahu’s aim is clear enough: put an end to Iran as a viable state, so it can never threaten Israel’s regional hegemony again (and stay out of jail by winning the election later this year -- the war is popular, which tells you how wide and deep the moral rot is in Israeli society). But the opposition leader Lapid has begun cautiously criticising the army’s overstretch.

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