The publication Big Think, that is dedicated to disseminating articles that deal with important ideas, asked me to submit an essay that explored the main ideas of my book The Great Paradox of Science. It was not easy to do so because the argument I developed had to be closely reasoned, which was why I felt it required a book-length treatment.
But I gave it a shot and came up with a 2,000 word essay that I think gets the gist of the book fairly well. You can read the essay here. As a bonus, they have also created an audio version of the essay that lasts for about 14 minutes.
An interesting article. Certainly impressive writing, to compress it all into a short piece like that (and very clearly).
I don’t buy this part of your argument:
Maybe it’s what some will conclude, but it doesn’t follow that there must be a unique representation. There is a unique reality (which can’t contradict itself), and you could be a pluralist about possible scientific theories which represent that reality.
So at any given time, we could have one of the multiple, contingent theories which is more closely representing the unique reality than whatever we had before. We can then correctly regard previous ones as inadequate (or less adequate or worse, however you want to put it).
The fact that there are multiple ways that science might have gone (or could go in an alien civilizations, let’s say) doesn’t prevent us from making that sort of progress toward a more accurate or more adequate representation of the real world. Why would it? We don’t literally interact with counterfactual states of affairs, and they never bother us either.
I’m not too fond of the evolution analogy; but if you want to run with it, the fact that there isn’t just one species (ours) which is “fit” or “adapted” to the environment, because instead there are many such species, doesn’t imply that there is no such thing as fitness or adaptation. It means that it can come (and has come) in a variety of different forms.
Similarly, theories fit into the human cultures which they inhabit. There can be others, or there could’ve been others, or there might actually be others right now on other planets…. And none of that sounds like a problem for the claim that any one of them (or all of them) can become better a representation of the world than what there was before.
That’s making a case for some sort of pluralism (because the uniqueness bit is the sticking point), which sounds pretty harmless to me…. It’s not that real progress doesn’t occur or that we should be anti-realists or some very dramatic conclusion like that. Right?
You could say that maybe “science” is treated by some as a kind of monolithic (or monopolistic) thing for which no side-by-side comparison of alternatives (at a specific time) is possible. But individual theories within the various sciences are not like that…. There are often many competing ones at any time (in whatever field it may be). And although it can take a while in some cases, we do very often get to see how those turn out. Some of them are duds, and some aren’t.
The part of the argument that you say you don’t buy about uniqueness, I don’t buy either. I was describing what many scientists imply when they say that their theories say something true about nature.
That kind of language is seductive. For example when you say that we are “making that sort of progress toward a more accurate or more adequate representation of the real world”, the phrase ‘more accurate’ has buried in it the idea that are getting closer to some unique representation. ‘More adequate’, however, is fine. We can have multiple representations and then judge them by their adequacy in making predictions that can be tested and that provide us with evidence to make those judgments.
Pluralism is a necessary consequence when we accept that our current theories are contingent on past actions.
But it doesn’t have that buried in it. It may be “tempting” as you put it, but it does not logically follow from that. That was my point. There’s a unique reality, and one (or many) may be closer to representing it than others.
Another analogy, not entirely satisfying to me either…. There is Mount Fuji, the actual mountain in Japan. There are many different renditions of it, which are a form of visual representation. Any given artist at any time can depict it more or less realistically. That there are many possible paintings (prints, photos, video games, etc.) has nothing to do with that.
The comparison to make (with “realistically” or “accurately”) is with the actual mountain, not with other logically possible depictions of it — some of which may not even exist, so of course you can’t even really do a comparison with them and there’s no reason that should matter anyway.
It just depends on the fact that there is an actual Fuji to represent visually. Then, you can compare that representation of Fuji with Fuji itself. For this to make sense, it certainly needs to exist, and it needs to be some way or another … But that’s it. There’s no claim here that there can’t be other representations, which are just as good (or better or worse).
Sure. I think good theories need to do more, but I’m basically okay with that.
I just don’t get the distinction between “adequacy in making predictions” and “accuracy.” That’s what it means to say that they’re more accurate, isn’t it?
Q: Accurate with respect to what?
A: With respect to the things about which it makes testable predictions.
And they are in fact more accurate in that sense, aren’t they? (And often better precision too.)
cr,
Is that a presupposition, a hypothesis, or an inference?
Huzzah! A great article.
However, if I’ve got one difference of opinion it would be that we already have multiple different bodies of science -- for example in research it’s more typical to use something that is not strictly “the” scientific-method but instead represents the best way to deal with a bunch of related theories and questions, rather than just one. However, a science student will use a different method of investigation (given the looming educational institution alongside them), and an engineer out doing industry work who is using their scientific prowess alongside their engineering chops would approach a topic in a different way again.
I’ll not deny that these are very close to each other, but they are different and mean that scientific thought -- which at no point becomes separate from the minds of people using it -- is not unique.
That said, I’m aware this is a very unfair criticism of someone’s hyper-condensed essay!
Also, I’m slowly putting together my thoughts on a semi-related topic: the limits and challenges or rationality -- hopefully getting good guides about when it is the best course of action and when it is not. Reading this stuff helps, thanks.
“Eliminating this myth would take away one of their main arguments.”
That pseudoskeptics love to attack strawmen is a pretty bad reason to get rid of a philosophical or scientific concept.
As if biologists should stop using the word evolution because creacrappers love to abuse it.
At this point I stopped reading.
John Morales:
It’s a premise in the argument Mano was responding to, and my objection was against that response. (It seems we mostly agree, but this seems to deflate that part of the response. Not sure where that leaves us.)
Anyway, I didn’t come up with that premise myself, clearly. Do you think it’s a controversial one? I don’t know what your concern is with regard to its epistemological origins or its status. A little help?
I suppose one way to get at this is to ask what’s needed to deny the claim that there’s a unique reality. To start with, I don’t think it’s a rejection of some kind of multiverse. If there’s a multiverse (no clear evidence for or against, as far as I know), then I take it that the whole thing is reality or a part of it. There would be ways to “represent” it if there is one; but at this point, I think we’re all pretty much in the dark about that. So to me, for these purposes, it makes no difference either way, and it doesn’t need to be rejected out of hand as a possibility.
Moving on…. We’ve got no evidence about the world, and you can’t do science with such evidence, unless there is a world. Although you could say I know it “empirically” that there is something, it’s also not like there’s any sort of experience I could’ve had which would’ve indicated otherwise. Make of that what you will.
I don’t know if you wanted to dig into the status of the law of non-contradiction or whatever, but I guess what is important about the “unique” qualifier is basically that there isn’t a contradictory reality (or more than one) to be represented. There just seems to be a consistent one, as far as anyone can tell. So in that sense, we can pin it down as a unique thing. It’s extremely vast, complicated and difficult to comprehend, but it could at least in theory be pinned down to something or other. Whatever that might be, it’s not the negation of that nor is it anything else.
As Mano said, you might be tempted to think that this entails that there can be only one possible “representation” of it, and as I was arguing, I don’t think that’s correct. (He doesn’t think so either.) But since it’s not forced but merely tempting, that should presumably take the argument in a different direction.
If it’s true, as it seems to be, I guess I just don’t have much reason to care about where that premise comes from. I’m okay with it, and just I’ll run with it, as long as it’s not causing any trouble.
cr:
You wrote that as though you were asserting it, in contrast to Mano, who put “if” in front of it.
That’s basically it.
I really like your article! Concise, to the point and well written.
Unfortunately, I was never taught any of it in my science education, other than as a passing note. I wish the philosophy and history of science played a role in formal education here in Germany.
btw, I think there’s a typo near the end of the third paragraph: acid “raid instead” of “acid rain”.
foxi @#9,
Thanks for the compliment.
And that was a good catch about the typo! I missed it, as did two people I gave to read it, and also the editorial staff at Big Think.