Last Wednesday a three judge panel of the US Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in the appeal of the US District Judge’s’ ruling that struck down Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage. Although over a dozen federal district courts around the nation have struck down the ban or aspects of it since the US Supreme Court’s DOMA decision last summer, and not a single judge has upheld it, this is the first time that this issue has reached the level of an Appeals Court, so this is a significant case
The district courts depended heavily on the DOMA ruling to arrive at their conclusions. As I discussed earlier, that ruling did not deal with the constitutionality of same sex marriage directly. Instead it had two elements. One was the so-called federalism issue of whether states had the right to determine who could be married. The Supreme Court said they did and that the federal government had to go along with whatever the states decided. But the other element was whether same-sex couples could be denied marriage benefits for no justifiable reason and whether moral disapproval of their conduct was a sufficient one, and the court ruled that they could not. It is this aspect of the ruling that has been so influential in the lower courts striking down the bans.
In order to decide the Utah issue, a key factor that the Appeals Court focused on in the oral arguments is what standard the courts should use to judge the case. There are three levels of scrutiny: rational basis, heightened or intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis is the lowest standard.
To pass the rational basis test, the statute or ordinance must have a legitimate state interest, and there must be a rational connection between the statute’s/ordinance’s means and goals.
There are three judicial review tests: the rational basis test, the intermediate scrutiny test, and the strict scrutiny test. The intermediate scrutiny test and the strict scrutiny test are considered more stringent than the rational basis test.
The rational basis test is generally used when in cases where no fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at issue.
The intermediate scrutiny level is stronger.
To pass intermediate scrutiny, the challenged law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially related to that interest. As the name implies, intermediate scrutiny is less rigorous than strict scrutiny, but more rigorous than rational basis review. Intermediate scrutiny is used in equal protection challenges to gender classifications, as well as in some First Amendment cases.
The strict scrutiny requirement is the strongest.
To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a “compelling governmental interest,” and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest. A famous quip asserts that strict scrutiny is “strict in name, but fatal in practice.”
For a court to apply strict scrutiny, the legislature must either have significantly abridged a fundamental right with the law’s enactment or have passed a law that involves a suspect classification. Suspect classifications have come to include race, national origin, religion, alienage, and poverty.
Megan Verlees says that what standard is used determines who has the burden of proof in the case.
Well, it seemed like [the Tenth Circuit Appeals court judges] were very concerned about this question of what kind of scrutiny they should give Utah’s marriage laws. Whether they should look at it with what’s called a rational basis, which is where the burden of proof is on the group that’s being discriminated against by the law to show that they’re being harmed unfairly and with animus, with malice, or to give it heightened scrutiny where the burden of proof would then be on the state of Utah to show that it had such an overwhelming interest in defending the traditional definition of marriage that it could make a law that harmed gay couples.
Lyle Denniston has his usual excellent report on the hearings. As he says, the issue of the appropriate standard dominated the discussion.
If there was one dominant issue, though, it appeared to be the rigor of the test the appeals courts will use to judge the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans — if they do reach that issue on the merits. One judge bluntly told the attorneys Wednesday that if the test is any stronger than “rational basis” — the easiest test to meet — then Utah’s marriage ban would be struck down, but that the ban would survive that easier standard.
If the Tenth Circuit is to move to a higher standard, it would have to cast aside or draw a distinction from a ruling that it had issued in 2008, in the case of Price-Cornelison v. Brooks. There, the Tenth Circuit firmly declared that claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation are to be judged only on a “rational basis” test. The Price-Cornelison precedent was explored at some length Wednesday.
Some federal judges — and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit — have interpreted the Supreme Court’s ruling last Term in United States v. Windsor as supporting the use of a “heightened standard” of review in gay rights cases. In striking down a key part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, the Supreme Court did not indicate what standard it had used and, indeed, it has never said explicitly what test is the controlling one. (Another appeals court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, adopted the higher standard in the Windsor case before that lawsuit went to the Supreme Court.)
Since there are so many such cases working their way through the various appeals courts, legal analysts are suggesting that this issue could go before the US Supreme Court as early as the 2014-2015 term.
There is also supposed to be a ruling today by a federal judge as to whether Ohio must recognize same sex marriages legally contracted in another state.
http://goo.gl/nvbSSG
I don’t even see how it could possibly meet rational basis -- The state’s argument that limiting marriage to prevent same sex couples getting married makes it more appealing surely can’t be considered a rational one, nor can the idea that they would do this because opposite sex couples are a homogenous grouping and it is best for children to be raised by opposite sex parents -- the second of these certainly was demolished in the Michigan ruling, and I’m pretty sure that one at least said that theere the state failed to make any sort of rational argument to link the law to any benefit
To be clear, “rational basis” only means that the interest the legislature believes it is furthering must be rational — not necessarily that a rational evaluation of the law shows that it actually furthers that interest. The motivation cannot be animus or malice, it must be a rational motivation; but there need not be any rational connection between that motivation and the rights being infringed.
Consider a law saying that redheads must obey a speed limit that is always 5mph lower than the speed limit for everyone else. If the purpose of the law was “we hate redheads”, then it would fail rational basis. However, if it was determined by the court that the legislature truly honestly believed that redheads were more likely to be injured in high-speed collisions — regardless of what the actual scientific evidence states — then, at least in theory, such a law could pass rational basis.
In the case at hand, if the appropriate standard is rational basis, and if the court finds that the purpose of laws banning same-sex marriage is truly to encourage procreation/child welfare/etc. (as opposed to those reasons being merely post hoc excuses to justify a limitation based purely in malice), then it would pass rational basis, even if the court finds no rational connection between prohibiting same-sex marriage and those ostensible aims.
If this makes rational basis seem like a really lax standard, it is. And FWIW, I think there is a place for that standard. It gives legislatures freedom to experiment, without having to a priori prove to the judiciary’s satisfaction that a given law will certainly accomplish its aims. The problem, rather, is that LGBT is a suspect class if there ever was one. Heightened scrutiny is a no-brainer here, and in that case prohibitions on marriage equality fail, badly.
Whether they should look at it with what’s called a rational basis, which is where the burden of proof is on the group that’s being discriminated against by the law to show that they’re being harmed unfairly and with animus, with malice….
In Perry v Schwarzenegger, this is precisely why Judge Walker said that that Proposition 8 didn’t pass even the rational basis test.
Also in Evans v Roemer (if I recall correctly) the Court explicitly pointed out that the whole for that state constitutional amendment was animus against homosexuals and not for any legitimate government purpose.
Thanks. I had heard that before, but I think my mind dismissed it as it makes so little sense to me.
Is there any sort of guideline to just how irrational a belief can be, before the judge can look at it and think “A person can’t reasonably hold this view”? For example if in the red head analogy, the state didn’t argue that redheads were more likely to be injured, but that cards driven by red heads burst into flames after a few thousand miles
Can the judge draw any inference from the state putting forward an illogical and irrational argument -- ie can they decide there must be animus if the state is to make such claims, or would they just have to say “I don’t know why you can make such a easily refuted claim, and I don’t think you can really believe it, but I can’t prove it is due to animus so I have to accept it”?
gshelley,
In situations like this, the lawyers for both sides will try to find earlier cases that are similar and use those to argue their case. The judge will then try to make a determination as to which makes the most sense. It is not a perfectly objective process.
This is where the burden of proof becomes important.
You pretty much answered that question in your second paragraph: Where that comes into play is if the judge(s) don’t believe that the basis in question is sincere. If no reasonable person could possible hold the viewpoint in question, then the judge(s) may decide that the legislature in fact does not hold that viewpoint, and is using it as cover for animus. It’s all very fuzzy, though.
I should have said upfront that I am not a lawyer, so take all this with a grain of salt. But that’s my understanding, and it explains why some pretty irrational things nevertheless wind up passing “rational basis”.